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The inferno of the living is not something that will be; if there is one, it is what is
already here, the inferno where we live every day, that we form by being together.
―Italo Calvino, Invisible Cities

Or by allowing ourselves to be assigned to particular political camps and identities by
the stories we choose or that choose us. Our inferno is constructed out of chaos, a
desire for order, and a demand for perfection. Some people embrace the inferno,
seeing chaos as a postmodern order; others struggle to survive it, and still others
condemn it as they search for ways to escape or oppose it.1
These are after all tumultuous times. There are always big and small crises—
social, economic, political, and cultural, with different consequences for different
populations. When multiple, concurrent crises become inescapably visible, the
intensities of the threats can feel unprecedented (as it has in previous moments as
well).
This is not the first time, even in my lifetime, that people believed they were
facing unprecedented challenges, fighting battles that could change the face of the
world.
This is not the first time that people thought the world was ending.
This is not the first time that culture has become the battleground. If you
don’t believe me, listen to the music of the past 60 years—and keep going back.
And I am by no means the first or only person to make these arguments. I do
not claim originality, and many of my positions and arguments can be found, usually
in fragments, all over the media landscape. My effort is only to assemble them and
articulate them into a coherent if uneven narrative.
If we want to change the world, we have to start with how politics has been
and is being waged and that means starting by trying to capture the tides of
history. Since the mid-20th century, the left has had moments when it seems to have
been the leading force of change, and it has had significant victories. However, despite
significant setbacks, the general direction of change has been forged by the right.
Conservative and reactionary coalitions have done a better job of analyzing the
everyday and institutional contexts.
1
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And that means examining the role of culture—in the form of stories—in the
struggles over social reality and power. In a society reaching for democracy, it is not
enough to force people to change their habits or (pretend to change) their
thoughts. You have to win people to your side, wherever they may be at the moment.
You have to change the stories, but that requires us to know how and why people feel
included in some stories and excluded from others. And that means that culture,
measuring the already available stories, recognizing the complexity of the landscapes
of experiences and emotions, and validating specific experiences and feelings by
reading them into stories (as I shall argue, of polarization) gives them new meaning,
transforming how people live and feel about their conditions. We have to recognize
that people live inside many stories (the voices in their head), many of which are
incomplete and contradict each other.
Part of what makes humans distinct is culture, although other species may
have something akin to culture, embodying in multiple media and forms the stories
that organize and make sense of the actualities and possibilities of contemporary life.
People need to believe that their place in the world, and how they live their lives, make
sense. Stories tell us who and where we are, how we got here, what sorts of relations
can or should exist among different groups; they tell us where we belong, how we feel,
how the world is supposed to be, and how we can get there. They tell us how to live
with differences; they simultaneously connect and disconnect people. They dictate the
logics with which people calculate their choices. Stories are our imaginations made
concrete and livable. They tell us what matters and what does not. They enable us,
even direct us, to see and hear certain complications and contradictions while
remaining blind and deaf to others. But stories take many forms; they are not only or
always narratives with a beginning, middle and end. They can be images, symbols,
materialities of all sorts.
Politics is not only the struggle to control populations, resources, and violence;
it also seeks to control the possible stories. It struggles to make one story (or a set of
stories, however inconsistent) dominant, to make it feel obvious, commonsensical,
unquestionable, and something worth fighting for. Power seeks to control the stories
we tell ourselves in order to establish systems of relations—linking particular material
and social relations to meanings, feelings, identities, and political positions.
We tell stories and they are told to us all the time—often implicitly--in
conversations, social interactions, and community organizing. But these stories are
not invented in the individual telling; they are collective. They surround and enable
such communications, shared in the various cultural institutions (religion, education,
the arts) but most importantly, in the media, and this has become more and more
unavoidable. Before the introduction of the telegraph, railroads, and especially radio,
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the U.S. did not have much of a national culture. These new media enabled the
production of such a national identity, and perhaps the multiplication and
fragmentation of national media has contributed to our contemporary situation.
If you want to change the world, you have to change the stories. Too many
people still believe that change comes only through an institutional change (elections,
court decisions, legislation, or regulation) without offering stories that convince
people of the value of specific changes. Or they mobilize people into new stories only
for the sake of institutional change, and then the story ends. Change, especially
democratic change, demands that one continually try to win “the hearts and minds”
of people, including those with whom one disagrees.
An organic crisis (from Gramsci and Hall) is a moment (a conjuncture) in a
society when there is a struggle to condense the multiple and dispersed crises into a
singular meta-crisis as it were. In fact, it may feel that the many crises almost demand
to be pieced together in an as yet undefined puzzle of a singular crisis, a mega-crisis.
culture becomes particularly important. But that has to be narrated into existence and
made intelligible to at least some sectors of the peoples. Thus, at such moments,
power and politics become largely cultural. As the Breitbart website put it, politics is
downstream from culture. The old stories—primarily of liberalism and communism—
no longer work. We reach for other stories to define and respond to the crisis.
Different stories offer different ways to make the crisis sensible, knowable, and livable.
Different stories respond to the organic crisis differently: by doubling-down on
common-sense opinions as if they were unquestionable, by tightening the
constraints—often through violence—on the stories that can be told, or by seeking
out new stories no matter how predictable or absurd.
How we experience, live, and feel about the world and our place in it depends
in large measure on the stories we tell and that are told to us. Many of the most
powerful stories today—whether addressing boomers or millennials—are apocalyptic,
nihilistic, or survivalist. Many people are anxious as they try to hold back their panic
over the dwindling possibilities for the future and the chaos of the present. We see
ourselves, too often, in the dark stories that portend an unlivable future.
We cannot even know in advance or guarantee whether and how people will
respond to different stories, or what their effects might be. Their outcomes are always,
to varying degrees, unpredictable. People live stories with different mixes of optimism
and pessimism, cynicism and despair, anxiety and commitment, depression and hope,
fear and action, love, and anger. Stories can leave us cynical and stuck in passivity or
empowered to act.
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Given this uncertainty, I want to circumscribe my argument with four limits.
First, it’s not that stories—again, one way of talking about culture—are the only thing
shaping the politics of our lives, or even that it is always the most important agency
shaping our world. But they do matter. Power is not all about culture but it is
inescapably about culture. At the same time, culture itself—the stories shaping our
lived realities—do not exist in some autonomous imaginary or symbolic realm. They
are inextricably linked to definite material—e.g., economic, historical, and
technological—conditions. And those conditions help to define what kinds of stories
are possible or impossible, how they can or cannot be distributed, to whom they can
speak, etc.
Second, trying to understand the state of society, especially one in an organic
crisis, is a paradoxical task. One has simultaneously to speak about the society as a
totality or unity while recognizing that the unity is fractured by and composed out of
its differences, its multiplicities and variations. It is what Stuart Hall called a “unityin-difference” and I do not know if I am up to this effort; it is not something one can
do alone. Some of the things I say we need to do are already being done by some,
perhaps, many people all over the political spectrum. Many of the practices and
attitudes I characterize as bad stories are tendencies rather than dominant realities,
which cannot be generalized because they have very specific locations. I am trying to
tell a story about some important practices and attitudes that define the politicalcultural field of struggle, because they are the most visible and most powerful voices
on the field of struggle. They may also be among the most extreme; I do not know that
this is a necessary relation, but they do maintain a certain kind of cultural dominance.
Third, consequently, no story can ever make sense of everything; we are not
looking for one answer to our problems; there are always multiple answers—many
offer important insights but they are always incomplete. But we can seek stories that
recognize the complexity—and even contradictoriness—of the social formation, and
hence speak with humility rather than certainty, that are always open to challenge and
question. But this has further—even intellectually radical—consequences. There is no
universal story, not even a universal sense of what constitutes a story. The very
concepts of unity and difference—and hence of the possibilities of “unity-in-indifference”—are, in Althusser’s terms, overdetermined, or in Stuart Hall’s reading of
Gramsci, they are always conjunctural—contextually specific, operating somewhere
between specific events (like Trump’s election in 2016) and abstract epochal
tendencies (like capitalism, religion, or climate change). There cannot be universal,
taken-for-granted assumptions about how stories are constructed, how new unities
are made, or what will constitute a better story. My own story, about stories if you
will, is both constructed out of and speaks most immediately to my own conjuncture.
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But we cannot let this fall into relativism, for there are always relations between
conjunctures, matters of what is new and what is old, and what is “the changing same.”
Parochialism need not be the opposite of cosmopolitan; it can also be an opening onto
the other, the known unknown and the unknowable unknown.
The stories we embrace (out of what is available) define the ways we respond
to crises and challenges, although more often than not, it doesn’t feel like we choose
the stories as much as the stories choose us. In our desperation, we often forget that
stories are fragile, imperfect, incomplete, bound to particular circumstances and
contexts, to different times and places, to particular pre-conceptions and lifeexperiences. Too often, we reach for shortcuts to survival; we want lifelines, and that
often leads us to embrace stories that are simply too simple, too sentimentally hopeful,
or too terrifying. We tell stories of doom and apocalypse, although how and when the
end will arrive varies a lot. And it does not help us to reproduce the common
symptoms of severe anxiety, such as “awfulizing.”
We tell wildly optimistic stories about how science or capitalism will save us.
We tell liberal stories about how we have to communicate, compromise, and move to
the center, as if the center is always the best or most reasonable place. We tell more
radical stories about evil and morality, about irrational nationalism, about totalizing
visions of oppression. But in an organic crisis, it is not enough to tell the stories that
make us comfortable, or scare us, the familiar stories that already live inside or on the
edges of our minds, or extraordinary fantasies with no anchor in the present. For what
we need from better stories is an understanding of the present, its advances and
accomplishments, as well as its failures and barbarities; we need to where and how
different peoples live within it. And we need to understand what Sartre called the
“field of possible” for a more humane future. But most of all, what we need to figure
out is how we—as a fractious and differentiated assemblage of peoples—can get from
here to there.
There are too many bad stories out there. Bad stories are not simply the ones
we do not like. Bad stories, for example, assume that everything is either the same old
same old, or entirely new. They too often reject the lessons of the past or they repeat
past strategies without questioning what has worked, what has not, and why. They
assume everything is about the same thing (e.g., economics, or culture, or race and
coloniality, or sex and gender), and that anything is, in the end, about only one thing
(again, the same list). Bad stories claim to have the only viable answer: we lost because
we did not organize locally, because we are fighting defensively, because we have put
identity over economics or institutions, because we have failed to empower “the
people,” because we have failed to see liberalism for what it is, because we have
surrendered our moral compass to capitalism and/or cosmopolitanism, etc.
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Bad stories generally do not understand how culture works, how the battles
are fought, how stories are told and disseminated. They do not understand how stories
are used and useful, how they can be and have been instrumentalized and
institutionalized in the varying means of their production and distribution. If we want
to tell or just recognize better stories, we have to learn to think differently, to think
about stories differently. On what foundation might they be built, while recognizing
that stories are neither universal nor simply local.
So how might one go about constructing a better story, one that does not
blame people but rather opens possibilities for different peoples (including
intellectuals and activists) to move from where they are? First, better stories accept
that the relations and structures that comprise any society are neither purely
accidental, nor were they ever guaranteed to be what they have become. Nothing—no
relation, no outcome, no identity—is certain, natural, inevitable, without alternatives.
Thus, these new ways of thinking will require the recognition that change is more
than an outcome; it is an ongoing and continuous process.
Second, better stories embrace complexity, without making complexity itself
into the magical answer to all disagreements, which ultimately undermines all
stories. All stories simplify the complexities of the moment, but that need not lead us
to the simplest stories. Society is complicated, involving competing and overlapping
systems of relations, experiences, stories, and institutions. It is a unique and unstable
mixture of the new and the old, sometimes remade to fit with the new. It is the everchanging result of the intersection of long-term forces (like capitalism and religion),
ongoing struggles for leadership and power, multiple stories and claims to truth
(neither absolute, certain, nor universal), and a small dose of chance (maybe a
pandemic?).
There is always more to tell; complexity demands that we constantly weigh
the balance between complexity and political necessity and efficacy. It demands that
we admit that we don’t know everything and acknowledge that others may know
things about which we are ignorant, and in ways that differ from our own. It points
us to our own parochialism, no matter how sophisticated we think we are.
Third, better stories know that ideas and thinking matter. Ideas are not the
same as beliefs and opinions; they arise from thinking and arguing with others, from
questioning and re-assessing what can be take for granted. It is not that opinions do
not matter but, rather than being possessions, they are the precondition of thinking.
Ideas demand that we take others’ ideas seriously and embrace the possibility that we
could be wrong. They do not lead to a purely objective, universal Truth but they are
the foundations and the results of the efforts to gain better knowledge of the context,
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of “what’s going on,” to measure the tides of change, and to imagine possible futures.
They address questions of human nature, the nature of knowledge, the meanings and
priorities of value, and particular claims about the social world. At each level, they are
based on some calculus of evidence and some logic of dissensus that themselves have
become a part of the culture wars. Thinking makes us, temporarily, strangers to
ourselves; it forces us into “double consciousness” to see the world from different
positions. And thinking never exists independently of emotions and feelings, desires
and interests, passions and deeply held certainties that appear unquestionable to the
person holding them.
Finally, better stories begin by understanding the constituencies that occupy
different positions within the stories. They begin by discovering where people are.
This is not merely a first step—something like a performance of trust—after which
you can turn to “rational” arguments. You cannot argue about whether someone’s
feelings are justified; you cannot simply call what they believe to be true
“misinformation” without understanding the stories and why they work or don’t
work. Better stories acknowledge the differences, even antagonisms, and accept that
people can share common goals but disagree with the analysis of where we are and the
strategies being used, or that they can share common strategies but not common
goals. Those constructing the new stories need to understand what the stories in
people’s heads mean to them and do for them.
Better stories have to understand what people feel and why. They have to
accept that such feelings are real, and “reasonable” responses—to those who experience
them. They have to understand others’ experiences and what they mean to them,
without condemning people out of hand as stupid, or gullible, or evil. They have to
include their own backstory: the beginning of any story is the end of a story that
remains unspoken. They seek to tell us something about why people allow themselves
to be spoken by particular stories, about why people may feel under- or misrepresented in the public culture. No doubt, a number of different groups feel that
the state has failed them, and that they are constantly being screwed by economic,
political, medical, educational, etc. institutions. They are not wrong, and they do not
necessarily align with a particular politics. Consequently, better stories have to open
up new spaces, invent new forms of communication, which allow arguments among
the differences, within radical disagreements: passionately and intelligently. Such
stories face antagonisms without being antagonistic.
I would propose one possible starting place: to interrogate where and how the
battles are being fought, and the stakes within the larger field of political culture. At
moments of an organic crisis, it may feel as if society is on the verge of collapse, as if
it has gone mad or been turned upside down. Many taken-for-granted assumptions,
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commonsense, and everyday habits, are disrupted, even overturned; and the
institutions embodying such truths become suspect. Such moments of transition,
when the old has not yet died and the new cannot yet be born, display many “morbid
symptoms” (Gramsci). Perhaps the current crisis is made worse by the broad
awareness of its existence, and the increasing ordinariness of frightening events and
events that seem nothing short of insane, evil, or the result of deep flaws (e.g., genetic,
socialization) in humans.
At such moments, it may feel almost impossible to create and effectively tell
stories that proffer new “unities-in-difference,” that offer more convivial and
democratic ways of living together. A big part of the problem lies in what has become
the dominant, commonsensical story (or stories) about the political and cultural
fields: the story that tells us, over and over, that the nation is radically polarized.
Occasionally, we reach back to precedents: the Civil War, the Gilded Age, the 1960s,
and then retell the same old stories as if they were natural and inevitable, whatever
the consequences. With more than a hint of the melodrama that guarantees news’
headlines, society is divided in simple binary terms—them and us. The many
differences amongst social groups and possible political constituencies are distributed
and condensed into two starkly drawn camps. The many different and unevenly
distributed positions on a range of issues are ignored—often around a shared symbolic
story that allows each constituency to believe that its issue is the central one—creating
a populist war between two illusorily homogeneous “camps.” Each side is assigned its
own essential unity, necessary identities, and political choices. These populist stories
of polarization set “the people,” those who have truly suffered the most, or those who
truly understand the truth of the United States, against an equally imagined
construction of the other as powerful and elite or as manipulated and ignorant. This
makes contemporary politics into a struggle between good and evil, black and white,
white supremacy and social justice, imperialist and colonized, male violence and
women’s rights, the right to life and the right to choose, democracy and
authoritarianism, faith and knowledge, commonsense and expertise, wealth and the
99%, elitism and anti-elitism, rural and urban, etc. I am not suggesting that such
differences are not real; they are real insofar as they have real effects, but I am
suggesting that the stories of polarization are bad stories, both intellectually and
politically. They do not allow us to grapple with the complex relations and
configurations operating; they do not the many struggles taking place within and
between the camps; and they do not offer us a viable means to move forward.
Here is the challenge—for me, for the intellectual project of critique, and of
cultural studies. Polarization is real but it is also constructed, a political strategy more
than a fact. It is neither guaranteed as the inevitable and necessary reality, nor is it
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accidental. It has real effects, whether intended or not, mostly overwhelming the
capacity to articulate new unities-in-difference that might be able to change the tides
of history. But the tides of history are neither global nor local; they are both and they
are neither, and they are constantly affected by many things, including the stories that
are being told and that we choose to tell. There are better stories to be told but they
demand that the intuitional and cultural conditions for intellectual practice as
convivial dissensus be re-animated and, perhaps, re-invented.
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